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The effects of team production on earnings is examined using the 1973 Quality of
Employment Survey. I find that the earnings of nonunion workers are positively related
to (1) team size, (2) the extent to which supervisors encourage team work, and (3) the
helpfulness of members of the team. These results are robust to controls for
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Team Production Effects on Earnings
I. Introduction
This paper examines evidence on the relationship between an employee's earnings
and the size of his team of co-workers. In addition, I investigate the effects on earnings
of involvement in team production, where a team production setting is indicated by the
presence of co-workers who are seen as helpful team members and by the presence of a
supervisor who facilitates team interactions.
The possibility that structuring the work environment according to team
production methods will have an impact on wages has been recognized in the economics
literature. Deardorff and Stafford (1976) theoretically examined the implications for
compensation of production in a setting where productive factors must cooperate to
produce the product, a situation that is essentially a team production environment.
Walter Oi (1990) further developed these ideas as one possible explanation for employer
size-wage premia. As Oi noted, since team production requires conformity to a common
work environment, "The wages needed to assemble a team are determined by the
reservation prices of the marginal team members ... big firms organize production around
larger teams and are hence obligated to pay higher wages" (p. S126). To date, though,
there have been no empirical studies in the general economics literature of the effect of
the size of an employee's work group their wages, possibly due to the paucity of
information on co-workers. Furthermore, no evidence has been presented on the
relationship between employer size and team size, or the effect of controlling for team
size on the measured employer size-wage premium. The primary goal of this paper is to
document team effects on wages, including information on the relationship between team
size and employer size and the extent to which larger teams in larger establishments
account for employer size-wage premia.
II. Data and Variable Description
There is little data available to evaluate the effects of team size, or team
production methods, on worker wages. Fortunately, the 1973 Quality of Employment
Survey (QES)1 contains sufficient information on individual worker attributes to estimate
a standard human capital earnings function, in addition to information about the size of
the respondent's team of co-workers and the extent to which the respondent's supervisor
encourages team effort. In addition, the QES has information on the size of the
establishment where the respondent is employed, so that team effects on earning may be
distinguished from employer size effects.
Table 1 reports the definitions of select variables used in this study, and lists
means and standard deviations for these variables. The central variable in this paper, the
size of the respondent's team of co-workers, is constructed as follows. Respondents were
asked the following questions: first, "Is there any group of people that you think of as
your co-workers ~ people whom you see just about every day and with whom you have to
work closely in order to do your job?", and second, "(If respondent has co-workers)
About how many people are there in this group?" These two questions are used to
construct the team size variable TEAMSZ, which is coded as zero if no group of "co-
lrThe 1973 QES contains information on 1,496 individuals residing in the U.S. (excluding
households in Alaska and Hawaii) who are 16 years of age or older and who were employed for
pay for twenty or more hours per week. The sample is therefore not representative of the entire
labor force, but is rather a sample of employed workers.
workers" is indicated, otherwise is coded as the number of co-workers indicated (the top
coding for this variable is 97 or more, for which TEAMSZ was set to a value of 97 ~
only 2 respondents, or 0.3% of the sample was so coded). The average value of this
variable for the 633 nonunion, nonagricultural private sector respondents used in the
earnings regressions in Table 3 below is approximately 8.6 workers, with 14.4% indicating
that they are not in a team.2
In addition to team size, I have attempted to incorporate into the analysis the
effects on earnings of a team production environment per se, as opposed to only looking
at the effect of the size of the team. A vector of variables that hopefully reflect a team
production environment are described in Table 1. First, TM_WK and TM_IDEA are
two dummies which indicate that the respondent feels that his/her supervisor encourages
people to work as a team and to exchange ideas relating to work. In addition, another
dummy is used, CO_WK, which indicates if the respondent feels that the people he
works with are helpful to him in getting his job done. Since this question was not asked
in reference to the defined group of co-workers per se, and was asked in a completely
different part of the survey, it may additionally capture the presence of a team
production environment in the work place — although admittedly it will be biased in the
direction of indicating that a productive team environment is present, rather than team
production per se. Nevertheless, while the interpretation of CO_WK may be particularly
problematic, the effects on wages of this possible instrument for team production are also
2The median value for TEAMSZ is 5, with 31.3% indicating that they work in a team at or
above the mean value of 8.613, 11% responding that they work in a team with greater than
twenty member, 5.7% indicating a team greater than thirty members, and 1.9% indicating a team
with greater than 50 members.
investigated.
III. Empirical Analysis
Table 2 looks at the distribution of team size across different size establishments.
We see immediately that team size is a positive function of establishment size — simple
univariate statistics reveal that mean team size increases monotonically with the size
category of the establishment, though there is substantial variation in team size within
different size establishments. Furthermore, a tobit regression was run in order to
investigate the relationship between team size and establishment size in a multivariate
context. The results reveal that this relationship is robust to controls for worker
characteristics, in addition to regional, industry, and occupational controls ~ the
coefficient (standard error) on LNSIZE in a regression that includes the full set of
controls (see the note to Table 3) was 1.671 (0.239), which is significant at the 1% level
(full results are available on request). This result supports the suggestion by Oi (1990)
that larger establishments organize production around larger teams of workers. As a
result of the positive association between team and establishment size, it will be necessary
to control for size of establishment in earnings regressions in order to see if team size
variations within a given size establishment have a significant effect on wages.
Table 3 reports the results of human capital (annual) earnings regressions that
incorporate these measures of team size and team production, in addition to controlling
for establishment size — earnings are used as the dependent variable instead of wages
because the 1973 QES unfortunately failed to ask weeks worked, so that a wage variable
cannot be constructed. The analysis has been restricted to nonunion workers since (i)
team size was found to have an insignificant effect on wages for union workers, as was
TM_WK and CO_WK (though TMJDEA achieved marginal significance), and (ii) a
Chow Test rejected pooling of the union and nonunion sample (the test produced an F-
statistic of 2.796, which is significant at the 1% level).
Looking at the first two columns of estimates3 we see that part of the well
documented establishment size effect on earning (see Brown and Medoff, 1989) is due to
team size effects, i.e. the product of the positive correlation between establishment and
team size combined with the positive effect of team size on earnings. Nevertheless, the
establishment size effect remains significant at 1% even when team size is controlled for,
and even remains significant when the vector of team environment dummies are
additionally included in the regression in the last column of estimates. Taken together,
these results indicate that the presence of larger teams in larger establishments do
account for some of the observed employer size-wage premia, yet the highly significant
residual employer size effect indicates that factors other than team size seem to still be
operating to form wage premia for nonunion workers in larger establishments.
The results in Table 2 also indicate that team size exerts a significantly positive
effect on (log) annual earnings even when establishment size is controlled for,4 indicating
3Note that all specifications reported in Table 2 include a full vector of standard controls, but
not surprisingly simple regressions without these controls also yielded significant coefficients for
all variables listed in the table (full results available on request).
4A linear specification of team size is reported since (i) a logarithmic specification was not
particularly viable given the large number of respondents with a zero value for TEAMSZ, and
(ii) a quadratic specification of team size had no substantively different effect on any of the other
variables in the regression, and while jointly significant the linear and quadratic terms were
that team size effects are not simply reflecting employer size effects. The parameter
estimates on TEAMSZ indicate that in addition to being statistically significant, the team
size effect is nontrivial — specifically, a one person increase in team size raises annual
earnings, on average, by approximately 3.5 - 4%, and a one standard deviation increase in
team size raises annual earnings, on average, by approximately 40%.
Finally, in addition to the effects of team size on wages, we see in the last four
columns of Table 3 that our vector of proxies for a team production environment also
are all significantly positively related to wages (though TM_IDEA becomes insignificant
when all of the team dummies are included in the last specification). The effect of team
size slightly declines (in magnitude and significance) when the team environment
dummies are added, indicating that part of the estimated team size effect was reflecting
simply the presence of team production. Nevertheless, the fact that the coefficient on
team size remains significantly positive demonstrates that the size of the team has an
independent effect on compensation net of the presence of team production per se.
IV. Alternative Interpretations of the Findings
Two possible factors that might be producing the observed significant residual
team effects on wages, in addition to the compensating differential factors suggested by
the Deardorff and Stafford model, are (1) efficiency wage payments based on monitoring
difficulties in larger teams, and (2) unobserved worker quality that leads to selection into
different size teams. Both arguments mirror the discussion that has developed in the
individually insignificant (results available on request).
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literature on employer size effects on wages, and as such will only briefly be discussed
here.
The monitoring explanation of employer size wage premia (see Oi, 1983 and 1990;
Garen, 1985) suggests that in large firms it is more difficult to accurately observe worker
behavior, and as such a profit-maximizing producer will pay wage premia that act to raise
the costs to the worker of being dismissed if caught shirking, leading to self-policing on
the part of workers. Of course, to the extent that monitoring is mostly done within a
work group by the supervisor, the size of the work group may be a better measure of
monitoring difficulties than employer size per se.5 Hence, workers in larger teams might
receive higher wages to produce greater self-policing by raising the value of dismissal
threats.
Unobserved quality explanations that have been used as explanations of employer
size-wage differentials (see Evans and Leighton, 1989; Idson and Feaster, 1990) would
also generate team size wage premium to the extent that (i) higher quality workers sort
themselves into work environments with larger teams, and/or (ii) employers who find it
beneficial to organize work in a team environment are willing to pay a wage premium for
workers with attributes that make them particularly valuable in such a team setting.
Specifically, if larger teams require greater interdependence of work, then a premium
would be paid (ostensibly made viable by higher team productivity) for workers with such
attributes as reliability (see Kremer, 1993). Furthermore, to the extent that workers in
5Of course, a supervisor may monitor a number of different groups, so that group size might
poorly measure monitoring difficulties ~ though it is not clear why supervisors in larger
establishments would necessarily supervise a greater number of groups.
teams are complementary factors, so that production functions are nonseparable with
positive cross-partials in team member inputs (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), then
higher levels of on-the-job training may be desirable in larger teams, leading to selection
of employees based on an imperfectly observed likelihood of successful investment in
training.6
The lack of team effects in the union sector is consistent with either explanation
above. First, since punishment for shirking through wage penalties or being dismissed is
harder to implement in the union sector, as would refusal of promotion given the stress
on seniority systems, the usage of wage premia to increase the power of dismissal threats
is less likely to be justified on efficiency grounds. Second, since wages are attached more
to jobs than people in the union sector, particularly able people would be less likely to
gravitate toward unions; though attempts on the part of union employers to hold down
costs per efficiency unit of labor may lead them to attempt to hire the more productive
workers, and unions may be amenable to this if wage premia are thereby easier to justify
and maintain.
V. Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that both team size and a team production
environment exercise significantly positive effects on wages, and that these effects are
independent of establishment size effects on wages. In addition, a number of
6Arguments based on higher desired levels of on-the-job training that originate in longer-term
employment relationships in larger firms (see Idson, 1989 and 1993) would not, though, produce
a team size effect (once employer size is controlled for) since failure probabilities and/or
opportunities for career advancement within the firm would be unlikely to be correlated with
team size per se.
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explanations for these finding have been suggested, though as with the literature on
employer size effects the data do not readily allow for empirical distinction between these
explanations. Specifically, an efficiency wage model is difficult to test with the 1973 QES
since information in other data sets that have been used to evaluate an information cost
model are not available; there is no direct information on monitoring behavior (see
Kruse 1992), piece-rate workers are not represented in the data (see Brown and Medoff,
1989), and there is no distinction between establishment and firm size (see Idson, 1993).
Second, the lack of panel information on team size does not allow for a first-difference
approach to evaluating the effect of time-invariant, unmeasured ability (see Evans and
Leighton, 1989), and the lack of natural instruments to predict participation in team
production (or the size of the team that the individual works in, conditional on
participation in team production) precludes meaningful estimation of a selection model
which treats participation in a team (or in teams of a particular size) as endogenous in
the wage regression (see Idson and Feaster, 1990). Nevertheless, a both significant and
quantitatively important team size effect has been demonstrated, and it will be the
challenge of future studies to attempt to disentangle the various advanced explanations.
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number of people who the respondent indicates
are co-workers in his team, defined as "people
whom you see just about every day and with
whom you have to work closely in order to do
your job."
= 1 if the supervisor "encourages those he/she
supervises to work as a team."
= 1 if the supervisor "encourages those he/she
supervises to exchange opinions and ideas."
= 1 if "The people I work with are helpful to me
in getting my job done."













NOTE: The mean (std. dev.) of establishment size are 446.67 (758.52). TEAMSZ is
coded to zero if the respondent indicates that he does not have a group of co-workers
according to the above definition. The three dummies are coded to zero if TEAMSZ








































NOTE: Cell sizes are reported in parentheses below the plant size category headings.
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Adj. R2 0.5844 0.5879 0.5929 0.5899 0.5911 0.5942
NOTE: All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares, and additionally
contain controls for years of formal education, quadratics in years of general labor
market experience and tenure with the current employer, dummies for race, gender,
marital status, residence in a SMSA, presence of a health problem that limits the type
or amount of work done, three region dummies, nine industry and six occupational
dummies at the two-digit level (full results are available on request). Parameter
estimates are listed with standard errors in parentheses (superscripts a, b, and c denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively). A joint significance test for
TM_WK, TMJDEA, and CO_WK in the last column specification yielded an F-
statistic of 4.10, which is significant at the 1% level.
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